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H.R. 23: An Assault on Water Resource Conservation and
California’s State Sovereignty
Ross Middlemiss*
“Whiskey is for drinking, water is for fighting over.” This observation,
attributed to Mark Twain, appropriately describes the centuries old struggles
surrounding water in California. The allocation of water has influenced
population growth, economic development, and environmental health in
California. The northern part of California—with plentiful watersheds fed by
coastal precipitation and Sierra Nevada Snowmelt—is pitted against the
arid, heavily populated southern portion of the state, a leading agricultural
region. Both the State Water Project (SWP) and the Central Valley Project
(CVP) pump fresh water from the San Francisco Bay Delta (Delta), supplying
drinking water for two-thirds of California residents and irrigating over seven
million acres of agricultural land.1 Competition for Delta water resources
has decreased wildlife habitat, threatened species extinction, increased the
risk of levee failure, and degraded the dependability of the Delta as a
reliable source of high quality water.2
Policies directing the quantity and timing of water exported out of the
delta draw fierce response from stakeholders on all sides of the debate.
Multiple California agencies influence the regulation of water in the state
while balancing the competing interests at play. This balancing act is often
complicated by jurisdictional issues that arise from the Federal
Government’s operation of the CVP. The Bureau of Reclamation began
construction of the CVP in 1937, completing a project that was previously
initiated by the state but abandoned during the Great Depression.3 The CVP
and SWP share storage and conveyance infrastructure, meaning that state
and federal operations must be closely coordinated.4 California’s agriculture
industry, worth nearly fifty billion dollars annually, is heavily dependent on
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1. In re Bay-Delta Programmatic Environmental Impact Report
Coordinated Proceedings, 43 Cal. 4th 1143, 1151 (2008).
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3. ABOUT THE CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT, http://perma.cc/LNM7-WLX3
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CVP and SWP deliveries. Control of these vital water resources is a high
priority for many state and federal politicians representing agricultural
districts and constituencies. It is no surprise then, that federal legislation
often has far-reaching impacts on control over California water.
Multiple federalism issues arise when the competing state and federal
interests in California water management collide.
The Gaining
Responsibility on Water Act (H.R. 23 or Act),5 now pending before the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the U.S. Senate, has set a
potential collision course. The Act, sponsored by California Representative
David Valadao, a Republican, passed in the House by a 230-190 vote on July
12, 2017.6 The Act purports to provide drought relief while serving “other
purposes,” such as managing water transfers via the CVP.7 Provisions of the
bill raise significant questions as to their potential impact on California’s
sovereign ability to regulate and control water resources within its
boundaries, under both state and federal law. The implications of the bill,
as now written, can be analyzed through three “prisms” of U.S. Supreme
Court precedent. These analyses will address provisions that may displace
California’s ability to enforce state water law, exempt federal actions from
environmental review, and/or commandeer state entities in violation of state
sovereignty.
Any resulting conclusions or projections could provide insight into
what a final draft might look like and its chances of being signed into law.
This investigation will highlight the manner in which legislators use
Supreme Court precedent in pursuit of a policy agenda. This legislation
demonstrates a clear preference for agricultural and water diverter interests
in the California water allocation debate. H.R. 23, in whatever form it may
take, will almost certainly attempt to constrain California’s ability to manage
its water resources in an environmentally protective manner.

Preemption Framework Concerning State Water Law
California v. U.S. is the seminal case regarding the joint obligations on
federal and state government regulation of water allocation.8 The U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation (USBR), in its operation of the CVP, sought a permit
from the California State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) to
construct the New Melones Dam and appropriate the subsequently

5. Gaining Responsibility on Water Act, H.R. 23, 115th Cong. (2017).
6. H.R. 23, GAINING RESPONSIBILITY ON WATER ACT, Recorded Vote on July
12, 2017.
7. Id.
8. California v. U.S., 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
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impounded water.9 The SWRCB conditioned the grant of the permit on,
among other conditions, the USBR first showing firm commitments, or a
specific plan, for where and how the impounded water would be used.10 The
U.S. argued, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that the state could not place
conditions on water appropriation permits for USBR projects.11 At issue was
Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, which declared nothing in the Act
would interfere with any state law “relating to the control, appropriation,
use, or distribution of water used in irrigation.”12 The Court held that the
SWRCB could place conditions on appropriation and distribution permits
for USBR projects “which are not inconsistent with congressional provisions
authorizing the project in question.”13 The Court later refined its holding,
stating that “the [Interior] Secretary should follow state law in all respects
not directly inconsistent with these [Congressional] directives.”14 This
holding provided Congress with potentially broad authority to preempt state
law governing water as long as Congress provided a clear directive to the
relevant federal agency.
Subsequent decisions must be analyzed to determine the extent of
federal authority to preempt state water law. In California v. F.E.R.C., the
Court found that minimum flow rates established under Federal Power Act
(“FPA”) authority preempted higher state-mandated flow rates.15 The Court
held the “other uses” language in Section 27 of the FPA, the so-called
“saving clause,” demonstrated congressional intent to provide exclusive
regulatory authority to FERC regarding water uses that do not implicate
proprietary rights:16
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as affecting
or intending to affect or in any way to interfere with the laws of
the respective States relating to the control, appropriation, use,
or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or
other uses, or any vested right acquired therein.17

9.

Id. at 651–52.

10. Id. at 652.
11. Id. at 645.
12. California v. U.S., 438 U.S. at 650–51 (citing 32 Stat. 390).
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

438 U.S. at 674.
Id. at 678.
California v. F.E.R.C., 495 U.S. 490, 496 (1990).
Id. at 505.
16 U.S.C. § 821 (1982).
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The Court relied on its interpretation in First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Co-op. v.
Federal Power Commission, which distinguished Section 27 of the FPA’s
regulation of “other uses” from Section 8 of the Reclamation Act’s “water
used in irrigation.”18 The First Iowa Court held that Section 27 only protected
from supersedure state laws commanding the control, use, appropriation, or
distribution of water in irrigation.19 As such proprietary rights are based in
state property law, the First Iowa Court found such rights to be saved from
FPC preemption.20 Finding no reason to overturn its own statutory
interpretation in First Iowa, the Court in California v. F.E.R.C. concluded the
state minimum flow rates were not proprietary in nature, and thus fell
outside of Section 27 protection as intended by Congress in drafting the
FPA, and were preempted.21
In holding the state minimum flow requirements were preempted by
the FPA, California v. F.E.R.C. can be used to clarify the scope of the California
v. U.S. decision. Distinguishing Section 27 of the FPA and Section 8 of the
Reclamation Act, the Court stated that the “FPA envisioned a considerably
broader and more active federal oversight role in hydropower development
than did the Reclamation Act.”22 If the FPA allows for less state authority, it
follows that the Section 27 “saving clause” would represent the minimum
amount of state authority reserved under Section 8 of the Reclamation Act.
As the California v. U.S. Court construed Section 8 “in a manner more
generous to the States’ regulatory powers than was First Iowa’s reading of §
27,” it can therefore be understood that California laws regarding proprietary
water rights are protected from preemption.23 Such an interpretation would
only allow a “clear congressional directive” concerning reclamation projects
like the CVP to supersede state laws regarding water allocation decisions.
The California v. F.E.R.C. Court referenced a presumption against federal
preemption in areas traditionally within states’ police powers.24 The extent
by which state water allocation laws might be preempted will therefore turn
on the clarity with which congressional purpose was subsequently

18. California v. F.E.R.C, 495 U.S. at 505 (citing First Iowa Hydro-Elec.
Co-op. v. Federal Power Commission, 328 U.S. 152, 175 (1946)).
19. 328 U.S. at 175–76.
20. Id.
21. California v. F.E.R.C., 495 U.S. 490, 506–07.
22. Id. at 504.
23. Id. at 491.
24. Id. at 497. (“Just as courts may not find state measures pre-empted
in the absence of clear evidence that Congress so intended, so must they
give full effect to evidence that Congress considered, and sought to
preserve, the States’ coordinate regulatory role in our federal scheme.”).
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expressed, and the history of deference to state authority over such
allocation.25

Application of Preemption Framework to H.R. 23
Whether provisions of H.R. 23 represent a “clear congressional
directive” can be assessed using the preemption framework referenced
above, established by California v. U.S. and its preceding cases. Section 108
provides in the “Congressional Direction” section that “The Central Valley
Project and the State Water Project shall be operated pursuant to the water
quality standards and operational constraints described in the ‘Principles for
Agreement on the Bay-Delta Standards Between the State of California and
the Federal Government’ dated December 15, 1994 . . .”26 The immediate use
of the “Congressional Direction” language is striking in terms of an express
congressional directive. The section then identifies specific water quality
standards (WQS) and operational processes by which the projects must
operate. The impact of this directive can be evaluated in two parts. First,
does a clear congressional directive apply to a purely state-run project such
as the SWP? Second, does the directive, as applied to the CVP, conflict with
state laws concerning proprietary water rights?
The Court in California v. U.S. focused its analysis exclusively on the
controversy surrounding regulatory authority over the New Melones Dam, a
federal reclamation project.27 In allowing California to impose conditions
“not inconsistent with clear congressional directives respecting the project,”
the Court referenced the extent to which a congressional directive might
preempt state law.28 A clear congressional directive does not stand on its
own, it must refer to the federal reclamation project at issue.29 The Court’s
preemption framework is set within the context of the federal project in
question. There is no indication that the clear congressional directive
overriding conflicting state law is meant to extend beyond the scope of the

25. U.S. v. California, State Water Res. Control Bd., 694 F.2d 1171, 1176
(1982, 9th Cir.) (“This admonition is particularly applicable in the
reclamation context. In this very litigation, the Supreme Court has detailed
the long history of ‘purposeful and continued deference to state water law by
Congress.’”).
26. Gaining Responsibility on Water Act, H.R. 23, 115th Cong. § 108(a)
(2017).
27. California v. U.S., 438 U.S. 645, 651 (1978).
28. Id. at 672.
29. Id. at 674. (“not inconsistent with congressional provisions
authorizing the project in question.”).
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project in question. It is thus likely that the mandated WQS and operational
processes of Section 108 of H.R. 23 are not applicable to the SWP as a clear
congressional directive under California v. U.S.
The impact of Section 108 on the CVP will turn on what aspects of
California law are implicated by the directive. As the CVP is a federal
project, is it clearly the object of the directive, proving analogous to the facts
of California v. U.S. wherein the federally controlled dam was in dispute.30
The inquiry should focus on the water uses the directive was intended to
affect. If Section 108’s requirement to follow the 1994 Bay-Delta agreement
pertains to allocation decisions, it is likely they will control. Conversely, if
the directive appears to implicate the proprietary water rights, there is an
argument to be made that such rights are protected from preemption. The
Bay-Delta agreement sets out WQS that set the upper limit of exports as a
percentage of Delta in-flow during different periods of the calendar year.31
This section of the agreement concerns the allocation of water exports to the
CVP; exactly the type of use the California v. U.S. Court concluded was in the
scope of a clear congressional directive’s preemptive effect.32 The deliberate
language of Section 108 belies Congressional intent to control in this area of
operation. The clear congressional directive applies to a federal project and
the allocation and distribution of water therefrom. It is likely that this
provision of H.R. 23 will preempt inconsistent state law.
Subsection (b) of Section 108 also raises preemption concerns and
requires comparison to the facts of the California v. U.S. case. This provision
prohibits the state or any federal department from imposing any condition
on any water right to protect any species that is affected by operations of the
CVP or SWP.33 This section raises similar concerns to subsection (a) in that
it directs the manner with which the State is to operate its own project.
Beyond this initial issue, the prohibition of “any condition” poses an
analytical challenge to the interpretation of California v. U.S. The Court
explicitly held that California could impose conditions on the Federal
project as long as the conditions did not run afoul of a clear congressional
directive.34 The conditions in California v. U.S., which restricted certain uses
to protect fish and wildlife, bear similarity to the prohibited class of

30. Id. at 674.
31. Principles for Agreement on Bay-Delta Standards Between the State
of California and the Federal Government, Water Quality Standards and
Operational Constraints, 1–6. 1994.
32. 438 U.S. at 675 (“control, appropriation, use or distribution of
water.”).
33. H.R. 23, 115th Cong. § 108(b) (2017).
34. 438 U.S. at 676.
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conditions outlined in Section 108(b).35 Despite the similarity to the
conditions the Court approved in relation to the New Melones project, H.R.
23 provides a clear congressional directive that would likely preempt
California’s ability to impose environmentally protective conditions on CVP
operations. A potential vulnerability of this provision concerns the scope of
the water rights to which the conditions prohibition applies. The language
fails to distinguish between appropriative and proprietary water rights in its
stipulation that State or Federal department shall not “impose on any water
right obtained pursuant to State law.”36 As discussed above, there is a
strong argument that proprietary rights remain in the control of State law
regardless of a clear congressional directive. If this were the case, the
preemption provided by California v. U.S. would not apply.

Nondiscretionary Actions Exempt from ESA Consultation
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires a federal
agency (“action agency”) to consult with agencies within the Department of
Commerce or the Interior to “insure that any action authorized, funded, or
carried out by such agency is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence
of any endangered species or threatened species.”37 How a federal action is
defined and the attendant discretion of the action agency factor into the
analysis of whether consultation is required under the ESA. This inquiry was
central to the Court’s decision in National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of
Wildlife, in which the issue of agency discretion was center stage.38 The Home
Builders Court addressed the issue of whether consultation was required
when the Section 7(a)(2) requirements seemed to conflict with statutory
mandates of the Clean Water Act.39 The conflict concerned the transfer of
NPDES authority from the EPA to State officials upon the state satisfying
nine criteria demonstrating proper state authority to implement the
program.40 The petitioners argued, and the Court agreed, that the ESA
consultation and required no-jeopardy finding would constitute a tenth
criteria, effecting an implied repeal of the CWA statutory mandate.41 The

35.
36.
(2017)
37.
38.
(2007).
39.

Id. at 652.
Gaining Responsibility on Water Act, H.R. 23, 115th Cong. § 108(b)
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644
Id. at 649.

40. Id. at 649–51.
41. Id. at 663.
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EPA argued this transfer represented a federal action for which consultation
was required under ESA Section 7(a)(2). The Court held Section 7(a)(2) of
the ESA only applied to discretionary agency actions, and not to nondiscretionary actions required by statute once “specified triggering events
have occurred.”42 The court supported this interpretation on regulations
implementing Section 7(a)(2) that read, “Section 7 and the requirements of
this part apply to all actions in which there is discretionary Federal
involvement or control.”43 Therefore, the Court concluded that the CWA
mandated transfer of NPDES authority once the nine statutory factors were
met, and that such a transfer of authority was not discretionary, and thus
exempt from ESA consultation.44
In the aftermath of Home Builders, the critical determination is what
constitutes a discretionary agency decision, and how specific a competing
statutory mandate must be to exempt Section 7 consultation. Shortly
following the disposition of Home Builders, the Ninth Circuit shed light on
when an agency decision is discretionary, “When an agency, acting in
furtherance of a broad Congressional mandate, chooses a course of action
which is not specifically mandated by Congress and which is not specifically
necessitated by the broad mandate, that action is, by definition,
discretionary and is thus subject to Section 7 consultation.”45 The Ninth
Circuit declined to read Home Builders to “immunize discretionary agency
actions simply because they are taken in pursuit of a nondiscretionary
goal.”46 Under this interpretation, specific congressional mandates directing
nondiscretionary actions would not require consultation, while an agency
choosing specific actions to implement broad statutory goals would require
a Section 7 no-jeopardy finding.47
Exemption from Section 7(a)(2)
consultation will turn on the extent to which Congress has specified how the
agency must fulfill its various obligations.48

Application of nondiscretionary exemption to H.R. 23
The discretionary authority of the Bureau of Reclamation and therefore
its obligation to consult under ESA Section 7(a)(2) is challenged by

42. Id. at 669.
43. 50 CFR § 402.03 (2016).
44. 551 U.S. 644, 666 (2007).
45. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917, 929
(2008, 9th Cir.).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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numerous sections of H.R. 23. Section 103 requires the Secretary, upon
request of the contractor, to “renew any existing long-term repayment or
water service contract that provides for the delivery of water from the Central
Valley Project for a period of 40 years.”49 The threshold inquiry is whether a
contract renewal is an “agency action” within the scope of Section 7(a)(2)
consultation. “Agency action” has been defined broadly, such that
negotiating and executing contracts is “agency action.”50 Water deliveries
from the CVP have a direct impact on the amount of water that remains in
the Delta and its tributaries, thus affecting habitat and species health. A
decision to renew such a contract for forty years would certainly affect the
Delta Smelt. Furthermore, this is not the first attempt to ensure the renewal
of water delivery contracts free of Section 7 consultation. In NRDC v. Jewell,
the Ninth Circuit held that as the Bureau of Reclamation had “some
discretion” in the decision to renew settlement contracts, Section 7
consultation was required.51 At issue were forty-year settlement contracts
pertaining to the CVP between the Bureau and senior rights holders.52
NRDC contended that the Bureau was required to consult with FWS
pursuant to Section 7 prior to renewing the contracts because of the
potential impact to the Delta Smelt.53 The court, on rehearing en banc,
reversed its prior decision, finding the Bureau was not so constrained by the
settlement contract provisions such that it lacked all discretion to act for the
protected species’ benefit.54 The requirement of consultation does not
depend on the degree of discretion, but whether the agency has any
discretion at all to act on behalf of species protection.55 This interpretation
can be applied to Section 103’s mandated contract renewal to find how
constraining it is of the Secretary’s discretion.
The contracts at issue in NRDC v. Jewell contained provisions locking in
quantities of water to be allocated for the duration of the contract and
subsequent renewals.56 This was argued to constrain the Bureau’s ability to
renegotiate new terms upon renewal, an argument ultimately dismissed by

49. H.R. 23 § 103(a).
50. NRDC v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 1998) citing 50
C.F.R. § 402.02 (“Action means all activities . . . . Examples include, but are
not limited to: . . . the granting of licenses, contracts, leases . . . .“).
51. NRDC v. Jewell, 749 F.3d 776, 785 (9th Cir. 2014).
52. Id. at 780.
53. Id. at 783.
54. Id. at 785.
55. Id.
56. 749 F.3d at 784.
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the court.57 In the case of H.R. 23, the provision explicitly requires renewal,
but does preclude renegotiation. Section 103(b) directs the contracts to be
administered according to a 1956 Act that supports the Reclamation Act of
1939; the cited statute does not appear to eliminate the Secretary’s
discretion regarding renewal conditions. As there appears to be “some
discretion” remaining, the act of contract renewal would require Section 7
consultation before being approved.58
Section 304 presents another instance of potential exemption from
ESA consultation. The provision directs the Secretary to allocate water to
service contractors within the Sacramento River Watershed in compliance
with minimum percentages of contract quantities based on the current water
year classification and the preceding year’s classification.59 After four
specific water-year-type minimum percentages are stipulated, subsection (e)
provides a catch-all whereby, in all other years, contractors must not receive
less than twice the allocations received by south-of-Delta CVP contractors.
This provision provides specific instructions for the Secretary to meet the
goal of delivering contracted CVP water. Such detailed directives, while not
as exacting as an exhaustive list of criteria as in Home Builders, do seem to
represent a course of action specifically mandated by Congress, and thus
exempt from the consultation requirement. A counter argument could be
made, relying on NRDC v. Jewell, that subsections (d) and (e) leave room for
agency discretion because they set minimum delivery percentages below
100 percent of the contracted amount. When the correct combination of
consecutive water years occurs, the Secretary may be positioned to decide
how much water to allocate between the fifty percent and 100 percent of
normal (subsection (d)), or what allotment to south-of-the-Delta contractors
will allow the twice as much provision to be satisfied. If these decisions,
while minor, are viewed as meeting the “some discretion” threshold of NRDC
v. Jewell, it would be sufficient to trigger the consultation requirement of
section 7(a)(2) of the ESA.

57. Id.
58. Id. citing Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 669 (“The agency lacks discretion
only if another legal obligation makes it impossible for the agency to
exercise discretion for the protected species’ benefit.”).
59. H.R. 23 § 304.
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Federalism Principles
“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the People.”60 The Tenth Amendment firmly articulates the line between
the federal government’s enumerated powers and those reserved to the
state, such that “all is retained which has not been surrendered.”61
Provisions of H.R. 23 raise concerns over the extent to which the Federal
Government can control California’s activities. The constitutionality of such
provisions will be analyzed using anti-commandeering principles
established by previous judicial interpretations.
The Supreme Court endeavored to discern the proper division of
authority between the federal government and the states in New York v. U.S.62
New York challenged provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act (LRWAP) of 1985, claiming its sovereignty was infringed in
violation of the Tenth Amendment.63 The Court held that the provision
requiring the State to either take title and accept liability for waste, or
regulate pursuant to Congress’ direction, was an untenable choice between
two options that would both go beyond the federal government’s
constitutional authority.64 In presenting the state with this choice, the Court
held that the act of Congress had “crossed the line distinguishing
encouragement from coercion,” as either action would “‘commandeer’ state
governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes.”65
The Court reasoned that when state conduct is commandeered, the
electoral responsiveness of both state and federal officials is diminished.66
Federal officials, responsible for locally unpopular legislation, can be
insulated from political accountability while state officials, pressed into
service of legislation they did not themselves create, bear the brunt of the
electorate’s anger.67 This rationale is made keeping in mind the possibility
of federal preemption of state law, but in this scenario, the federal decision
is in full view of the public.68 In keeping with the ideas of federalism
enshrined in the 10th Amendment, the power reserved to the people

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

U.S. CONST. amend X.
U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
Id.
Id. at 175
Id.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 169.
New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. at 169.
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necessitates a local government that is responsive to local preferences, and
these preferences should not be imposed without express constitutional
authority.
While finding the take-title provision a violation, the Court did identify
two ways in which Congress’ actions were within its Constitutional authority.
Congress’ authority under the Spending and Commerce Clauses were held
to support the LRWAP’s provision of financial incentive for state
compliance.69 Additionally, when exerting Commerce Clause authority over
private individuals, Congress may offer states a choice between regulating
the activity under federal guidelines, or having the federal regulation
preempt state law.70 These permissible federal intrusions into areas of state
governance must be kept in mind when assessing the commandeering or
preemptive effect of H.R. 23.
The Court elaborated on the constitutional limits examined in New York
when it decided Printz v. U.S. a short time later.71 The Court held that the
Brady Act’s requirement that local Chief Law Enforcement Officers (CLEOs)
perform background checks of prospective gun purchasers was
unconstitutional.72 Building upon the New York holding, the Court stated
that Congress cannot circumvent the prohibition on compelling states to
implement federal regulatory programs by instead directly conscripting state
officers to administer the federal regulatory programs.73 The Court found
this provision of the Brady Act extended beyond the constitutional power
granted to Congress by the Necessary and Proper Clause.74
The principles established in New York and Printz were subsequently
discussed and applied in Reno v. Condon.75 Condon analyzed whether a federal
statute that banned state DMVs from disclosing and selling personal
information without the consent of the driver violated previously stated
principles of federalism.76 The Court found the statute in question to be a
valid exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority because it did not
require the state legislature to enact any laws, nor did it require State
officials to assist in the federal regulation of private individuals.77 The Court
also addressed the distinction between unconstitutional laws that regulate

69. Id. at 173
70. Id. at 173–74.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
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Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Id. at 933.
Id. at 935.
U.S. Const. Art. I § 8.
Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
Id. at 143.
Id. at 151.
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the states exclusively, and permissible laws of general applicability, which
apply the duty to citizens as well as states.78 The decision reasoned that the
statute regulated the “universe of entities” that took part in the market in
question, the DMV disclosure and sale of information and its use by private
parties in commerce.79 General applicability will add yet another layer of
analysis to the validity of H.R. 23 provisions in addition to the anticommandeering principles of New York and Printz.
The cases discussed above provide a lens through which to view the
possible federalism violations of H.R. 23. The Court’s interpretations in New
York, Printz, and Condon define the limits of the federal government’s ability
to compel state action. Alternatively, the Supremacy Clause allows federal
law to preempt contrary state law, blocking state action on an issue.80
Whether provisions of H.R. 23 compel state action or prohibit California
from administering its own laws will be a key inquiry in assessing the
validity of the statute.

Application of Federalism Principles to H.R. 23
California’s sovereignty is challenged when H.R. 23 specifically
references operation of the SWP. The SWP operates exclusively within
California’s borders and is managed by state agencies. Section 108,
discussed at length above, provides multiple instances of Congress dictating
how the SWP shall be operated.81 Section 108 positively mandates operation
of SWP in accordance with the Bay-Delta Agreement. Congress is requiring,
via federal legislation, the SWRCB to operate a state project in accordance
with a specific regulatory framework. The question is whether the
Agreement qualifies as a federal regulation, similarly to the LRWAP the New
York Court cited as intruding on New York state sovereignty.82 It could be
argued that by referencing a previous agreement between the state and
federal authorities, H.R. 23 effectively adopts the Agreement’s regulations
and standards into its text. There is no practical difference between the
external reference and the regulations being printed directly within Section
108. It would follow that Section 108’s mandate compels a state agency to
adopt and implement federal regulations in operation of a state project,
running afoul of the principles set forth in New York and Printz.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2.
H.R. 23, 115th Cong. § 108 (2017).
New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. at 149.
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Considering the principles set forth in New York, Printz and Condon, it is
less clear how negative federal mandates for states fit into the anticommandeering analysis. While there is certainly federal authority to
preempt state law under the Supremacy Clause, the anti-commandeering
cases present potential limits to Congress’ ability to prohibit state activity.
Section 108 prohibits any California agency from restricting the exercise of
any water rights obtained pursuant to state law to “protect, enhance, or
restore under the Public Trust Doctrine any public trust value.”83 The Public
Trust Doctrine (PTD) states that certain resources are inherently preserved
for the public use, and therefore government owns and has a duty to protect
such resources in the name of the public trust.84 The California Supreme
Court embraced the PTD in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, requiring
State agencies to consider trust values before approving water diversions.85
Diverting water from a natural water course requires an affirmative act, as
the water of the Delta does not naturally flow into the CVP or SWP. By
prohibiting the state from “restricting the exercise of an appropriative water
right,” Section 108 is in effect compelling the state to make water deliveries
in accordance with federal regulations. The federal regulations in this
instance do not recognize the public trust values central to California water
policy.
The uncertainty in applying the anti-commandeering and supremacy
principles to negative mandates also impacts the public’s ability to be
informed of regulatory decisions. New York discusses the negative effect
commandeering has on electoral accountability.86 When state officials must
regulate an affirmative act at the direction of the federal government, they
are potentially subjected to the brunt of public discontent over legislation
they did not create.87 The opinion describes how preemption in “full-view”
can properly direct electoral repercussions toward federal lawmakers. If
California officials are prohibited from implementing the PTD in water use
decisions, thus increasing diversions under the guidance historically unclear
water rights, will it be clear to California citizens which authority made the
decision? It seems the New York Court was referencing just such a scenario
when it discussed the purpose of anti-commandeering principles.
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Conclusion
In summation, H.R. 23, as currently written, poses multiple challenges
to California’s ability to regulate state water resources in an environmentally
protective manner.The statute includes numerous “clear Congressional
directives” that aim to supplant state water law under the Court’s California v.
U.S. holding. This analysis will depend on the type of water right that is
subject to the Congressional directive. The state can arguably retain control
over proprietary rights, whereas a Congressional directive can control
allocation decisions. Another Supreme Court prism of analysis focuses on
H.R. 23 provisions that remove agency discretion to a point where ESA
consultation is not required. The Court’s Home Builders decision does not
precisely define the boundaries between discretionary and nondiscretionary
actions. A strong argument can be made that any trace of agency discretion
sustains the consultation requirement, and such an argument is warranted
when viewing sections of H.R. 23. Lastly, the anti-commandeering rules
established by past Court decisions provide another framework for analyzing
the validity of H.R. 23. The statute appears to push the bounds of
Congressional authority over state activities, hovering around the
uncertainty between compelled state action and inaction.
H.R. 23, regardless of its final form or enactment, represents a threat
to California’s ability to implement its laws regarding state water resources.
This paper has sought to provide a platform upon which the statute can be
analyzed. The lengthy document surely presents more opportunities for
dissection than this brief paper covers. Issues of federalism will surely
predominate the discussion surrounding environmental management and
sustainable resource use as California moves forward in the Trump Era.
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